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Does natural resource abundance decrease Latin American Foreign Direct Investment?  This paper studies the effects of natural 
resource abundance on foreign direct investment (FDI), by focusing on inequality as the channel that links these two variables. 
Two arguments in the literature inspire this paper: 1) scholars attribute Latin America’s high income inequality to its abundance 
of natural resources; and 2) some scholars argue that income inequality leads to lower investment. I argue that large shares of 
capital-intensive endowments (export measured as percentage share of GDP) are associated with low levels of secondary and 
tertiary FDI. The theory is based on the Stopel-Samuelson model, which claims that rises in the price of a capital-intensive 
commodity leads to an increase in the return to capital, and conversely, to a fall in the return to labor and wages. I analyze this 
logic through a two-stage least square model examining 15 Latin American countries from 1984-2007. I conclude, among several 
conflicting results that the inequality levels generated by exports can explain 40 percent of the variance of secondary and tertiary 
FDI.    
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Natural Resource abundance and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America 
Does natural resource abundance decrease foreign direct investment? 
Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a crucial ingredient of the global economy. In Latin 
America, FDI is a major source of economic growth, employment, technology, and productivity. 
Because of these benefits, attracting FDI in the region has become a key element of strategies 
promoting economic development. However, attracting FDI requires governments in these 
countries to provide hospitable climates for foreign investors. A friendly environment for 
multinational corporations entails a set of macroeconomic factors such as welcoming exchange 
rates, inflation rates, tax rates and a degree of economic openness (Jensen 2003, 587-588). 
Qualitative or institutional factors favorable to FDI are the legal system, a politically stable host 
country, with high levels of human capital, measured by school enrollment (Walsh and Yu 2010, 
4-7). Latin America faces great challenges in maintaining a friendly environment from both 
macroeconomic and institutional perspectives. The income inequality of the region, the highest 
in the world, remains one of its major defining characteristics. Scholars have pointed to the 
region’s natural resource endowments as an explanation for the levels of inequality, also known 
as the “resource curse” (Sachs and Warner 1995, 4). In other words, countries gaining an 
important part of their revenues from natural resources tend to have a lower economic growth 
and suffer from higher poverty rates. This paper studies the effects of natural resource abundance 
on foreign direct investment (FDI), by focusing on inequality as the channel that links these two 
variables.  
Scholars have dedicated large amount of research to the puzzle of Latin America’s poor 
economic performance. Among the literature, two arguments inspire this paper: 1) explanations 
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attribute the region’s high income inequality, to its abundance of natural resources (Leamer et al. 
1999, 40); and 2) income inequality leads to lower investment (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 1225-
1226). Leamer et. al (1999) explore the idea that countries with permanent agriculture and 
mineral extraction absorb a natural-resource-rich country’s scarce savings, delaying the 
emergence of manufacturing. Nevertheless, they argue that if manufacturing does emerge it 
concentrates on moderate- to high-capital-intensive products. On the one hand, this path benefits 
these countries because it allows them to avoid competing with China and India, countries that 
are labor-abundant. On the other hand, resource-rich countries must pay the cost of a higher 
income inequality associated with the production of permanent crops and ores, and the delay in 
greater income equality caused by manufacturing and the accumulation of human capital that it 
requires to be sustained (Gelb 2010, 4-5). 
For the purpose of the argument suppose that A = natural resource abundance, B = 
inequality, and C = FDI. Considering that scholars claim that A leads to B and that B leads to C, 
to what extent can we claim that A leads to C, through the path of B? This, of course, is an 
assumption grounded on the assertion that because it is assumed that natural resources 
abundance increases inequality, and because it is also assumed that inequality reduces 
investment, then natural resources will have a negative impact on such investments. Let us first 
examine the logical path from A to C, through B. 
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Literature Review and Theory 
Natural resource abundance and inequality 
A leads to B 
Raúl Prebish (1949) put forth the argument that the abundance of natural endowments 
has an impoverishing effect on Latin American resource-rich countries. First, natural resource 
abundant countries face declining terms of trade: as developed nations accumulate wealth, its 
demands for raw materials declines relative to its demand for manufactures and services. Second, 
efforts to revert this cycle may aggravate it: in order to buy machinery and technology to begin 
producing manufactures, resource-rich countries have to further advance their export sales, 
decreasing their own price (Prebish 1949; Fishlow et al. 1978). This effect of natural resources 
has been exacerbated in Latin America countries where land ownership is highly concentrated, 
perpetuating inequality. Third, scholars link natural resources with income inequality based on 
the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson mapping of product prices into factor rewards. The model 
states that a rise in the relative price of a good will lead to a rise in the return to that factor which 
is used most intensively in the production of the good, and conversely, to a fall in the return to 
the other factor (Leamer et al.1999, 4-5). For example, in a scenario of high manufacture prices, 
Asian countries producing labor-intensive manufactures will experience a rise in the return to 
labor, and a fall in the return to capital. However, in Latin America, countries producing capital-
intensive products like raw materials will experience a rise in the return to capital and a fall in 
the return to labor, meaning a decrease in workers’ wages. Therefore, people in countries with an 
export product mix dominated by capital-intensive industries will have lesser access to the fruits 
of rising prices of these industries. In summary, factor rewards –i.e. workers’ wages- depend 
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upon export product mix which depends upon endowments. As a result we can observe how 
some endowments attract sectors that promote equality, like in the case of Asian countries, and 
others, like in Latin America, do not (Leamer et al. 1999).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the impact of natural endowments on the evolution of 
political institutions in Latin America because it shows us another way in which the abundance 
of natural resources impact inequality. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that the abundance 
of tropical cropland in colonial Latin America created unequal and concentrated land ownership 
because the economies of scale of permanent crops –i.e. sugar, coffee- stimulated the acquisition 
of greater pieces of land. Furthermore, in Latin America, Spain tended to award very large pieces 
of land to worthy recipients, along with titles that fostered feudalism and politics of 
institutionalized exclusion (Leamer et al. 1999, 6). Spilimbergo et al. (1999) shows us how land-
intensive countries have a less equal income distribution while skill intensive countries have a 
more equal income distribution, even when controlling for trade openness. 
Inequality and investment 
B leads to C 
Foreign investment is very important to Latin America since it has been one of the major 
sources of external financing in the last few years and has also helped modernize the region’s 
economic structure (García-Herrero and Santabárbara 2007, 3). There exists a widespread belief 
that FDI is the capital inflow that provides one of the greatest contributions to long-term growth 
and development (IMF, World Economic Outlook 2007). FDI lands in the host country with a 
variety of positive externalities: foreign technology and management skills that are adapted by 
the recipient country, and are translated into other sectors. Thus, attracting FDI is among the top 
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priorities of economic development. Favorable factors that make companies service foreign 
markets through affiliate production are: 1) access to resources and markets; 2) efficiency gains 
through synergies; and 3) acquisition of strategic assets (Walsh and Yu 2010, 4). In order for a 
company to be able to successfully attain the promises of those factors, there needs to be a 
welcoming and relatively stable economic and political environment, coupled with high levels of 
human capital to provide the labor force that FDI requires. However, in the context of unequal 
societies, like that of Latin America the job of setting a welcoming stage for FDI is harder to 
achieve. Alessina and Perotti (1996) claim that it is inequality what mainly generates the social 
discontent that sparks political instability and detracts foreign companies from investing. Their 
literature offers a model to measure the impact of inequality on investment through political 
instability, by regressing investment on an index of political stability, GDP, and school 
enrollment, on a sample of 71 countries. The authors find that political instability is negatively 
correlated to levels of investment, with no specification on whether this investment is foreign or 
domestic (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 1223-4).  
Having discussed the impact of natural resource abundance on the levels of income 
distribution, and that of inequality on investment and considering that these models do not 
specify on the type of foreign investment, it is necessary to analyze the extent of such claims for 
FDI. Two questions remain to be answered: is natural resource abundance negatively correlated 
to levels of FDI? And is inequality the appropriate link to establish such negative relationship 
between natural resource and FDI? In other words, could we really claim that because natural 
resources increase inequality and because inequality decreases investment, then natural resources 
decrease investment? And if so, assuming that resource abundance fuels inequality, does it affect 
primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI in the same way? 
6
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Natural resource abundance and FDI 
A leads to C 
The literature has looked at several macroeconomic variables to explain the different 
levels of FDI throughout time. Authors have focused on the market size and growth potential due 
to the lower costs resulting from economies of scale. Evidence has been provided that larger 
populations and transition economies with larger economies attract more FDI (Resmini 2000; 
Bevan and Estrin 2000). Also, a decrease in openness has been found to enhance horizontal FDI 
as firms evade trade barriers by building production sites in other countries (Walsh and Yu 2010, 
5). In a more obvious way, an increase in openness might be associated with an increase in FDI 
as the number of opportunities for investment increases (Resmini, 2000). In a similar way, 
weaker exchange rates in the recipient country increase FDI as the price of assets decrease (Froot 
and Stein 1991; Bloningen 1997). The very same large presence of international business leads 
to even higher levels of FDI, either because companies share projects, or because the mere 
presence of FDI signals to the community that the business environment is favorable. Businesses 
may value other companies’ experience as a way of reducing costs by avoiding previous 
contextual mistakes.  
Recent findings have highlighted the constraints faced by foreign firms in their activity 
due to a lack of physical infrastructure, and skilled workers compared to firms supplying the 
domestic market (Kinda 2009). This would give us reasons to suggest that secondary and tertiary 
FDI are positively correlated with secondary and tertiary school enrollment. These types of FDI 
require higher levels of education than primary FDI since their supply consists of manufacturing 
and services, associated with a larger presence of skilled workers in their production functions. 
However, Walsh and Yu (2010) show that education, measured in school enrollment have little 
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effects on FDI. Their results highlight the negative relationship between secondary and tertiary 
school enrollment and levels of tertiary FDI. The reason they provide for this counterintuitive 
correlation is that current levels of enrollment do not reflect the level of skills attainment in the 
economy, and that tertiary education is too broad of a criterion, not reflecting the level of specific 
skills that workers need to encourage more FDI in services.  
Furthermore, the literature has pointed to other factors affecting FDI in the region, for 
example, the nature of China’s inward FDI. Authors have found that Chinese inward FDI have 
had a significant negative impact on FDI in Mexico, Colombia and Central America, because of 
the export oriented nature of their FDI inflows, which compete in the same export markets. They 
have also found that if FDI is oriented towards China’s domestic demand, such as the case of 
exporters of commodities, then China’s FDI inflows might be positive for those countries that 
have natural resources (García-Herrero and Santabárbara 2007). 
Hypotheses   
First, the logic of the first hypothesis follows the Stopel-Samuelson model: a rise in the 
relative price of a good will lead to a rise in the return to that factor which is used most 
intensively in the production of the good, and conversely, to a fall in the return to the other 
factor. I expect large shares of capital-intensive endowments (export measured as percentage 
share of GDP) to be associated with low levels of secondary and tertiary FDI, because the little 
access of the general population to the fruits of the capital puts downward pressure on workers’ 
wages. This pressure not only increases inequality but also limits the workers’ opportunities of 
investing in their education. The less educated a society is, the fewer the supply of skilled labor 
needed for manufactures and services. Furthermore, a population that has less participation in the 
large industries of the economy might observe difficulties in counting with the levels of income 
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needed for capturing the opportunities that could improve their status. Widespread unequal 
opportunities in education will first reduce the number of high-skilled workers, increasing the 
wages of these and widening the gap between low and high-skilled workers. Unequal 
redistribution of income will result in a more dissatisfied society, fueling social unrest and 
leading to more unstable political environments. Countries with such characteristics of internal 
conflict and unsteady politics could in turn detract big companies from investing. If economies 
do not count with a diversified net export product mix, and only hold large shares of capital-
intensive industries, the resulting inequality will lead to higher levels of social discontent. Such 
discontent will be translated into a higher demand for fiscal redistribution, financed by 
distortionary taxation, thus lowering the rate of growth. High levels of inequality, coupled with 
low levels of growth due to distortionary taxation would lead to a less stable government and 
more divided government (Josten and Truger 2003, 5). As contending forces from the opposition 
might try to profit from the discontent of the people, the strength of government in the legislature 
and popular support might decrease. This will threaten the governability of the incumbent. In the 
context of poor institutions of enforcement of order, discontent might turn into riots and strikes 
that will make the country be perceived as unstable by foreign investors, lowering total FDI. 
Therefore: 
H1: large shares of capital-intensive endowments (measured as % export share of GDP) are 
associated with low levels of FDI.  
Second, I argue that larger shares of natural resources serving labor-intensive industries 
will increase the levels of secondary and tertiary FDI, because these industries will allow for a 
larger redistribution of capital among workers, compared to capital-intensive ones. Increases in 
the relative prices of labor-intensive industries will in turn increase the return to labor, which will 
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be translated in higher wages for workers. This permits the population to invest in education and 
increase human capital accumulation, setting a more appropriate labor environment for 
companies investing in manufacture and services, also known as secondary and tertiary FDI. 
The more prevalent labor-intensive industries are in the export product mix of a country, 
the more equality they will generate because the amount of people that these industries will 
employ is significantly higher than that of capital-intensive ones, and therefore the more access 
society as a whole will have to the fruits of the capital (Leamer et al. 1999, 13-14). In good 
economic times, and good international prices the profit shares of labor-intensive industries will 
lead to a higher redistribution of wealth and a shortening of the gap between the rich and the 
poor. The factor rewards of employees of such industries will yield higher returns, and therefore 
will have more opportunities of investing in their own education. The more educated the society, 
the more likely that they will resolve their conflicts through negotiation and the less likely that 
social unrest will occur (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 1225). If economies count with a diversified 
net export product mix, and among them the labor-intensive industries hold a large share of 
exports the resulting benefits for workers could lead to higher school enrollment and a potential 
decrease in inequality. Secondary and tertiary investment will increase as the society will offer 
better opportunities for investors searching for skilled labor. Therefore: 
H2: large shares of natural resources that feed labor-intensive industries will increase the 
levels of secondary and tertiary FDI.       
A counter argument to these hypotheses is that downward pressure on wages due to a 
decrease in the return of factor rewards might attract foreign companies seeking for low labor 
costs. Furthermore, Falk (2002) argues that the interests of foreign companies are best served by 
governments that severely control their even dissatisfied workers, and that can ensure conditions 
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favorable to their investments (Blanton and Blanton 2007, 143). However, politicians seek 
reelection, and considering the political trend of Latin American leaders in the past ten years they 
are less permeable to lobby groups than they are to citizens’ pressure. Broad access to elected 
officials and the democratic participation of dissatisfied citizens might offer institutionalized 
venues through which workers can seek protection from the state, like less flexible labor policies 
and longer contracts (Li and Resnick 2003, 177).    
Methodology and Analysis 
Model 
This paper analyzes levels of natural resources, inequality, and FDI from fifteen Latin 
American1 countries from years 1984 to 2007. The statistical model2 takes the shape of a two-
stage least square regression (2SLS) using a first model –Stage A- predicting inequality from 
natural resource abundance and a second model –Stage B- predicting investment from inequality. 
The first model, put forth by Leamer (1999), attempts to explain income inequality through the 
presence of natural resources, by regressing GINI values on net exports disaggregated by type -
petroleum, agricultural, forest, labor and capital-intensive products, machinery, and chemicals. 
The second model, put forth by Alesina and Perotti (1996) attempts to explain levels of 
investment from levels of income inequality, by regressing levels of exports (as a percentage 
share of GDP), on GINI values. The 2SLS model set forth in this paper attempts to evaluate 
inequality as the path coefficient between natural resource abundance and FDI. My adaptation of 
the first model tries to predict levels of inequality (measured with GINI coefficients from the 
                                                 
1 The fifteen Latin American countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Other countries 
from the region were excluded due to data availability on FDI.  
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WDI) from natural resource abundance (measured by industry exports as a share of GDP in 
constant U$ 2000). The control variables are replicated from the Leamer model as worker’s 
share of crops and forest land (measured from WDI as the share of Arable land and Forest land 
in hectares per Economically active population in agriculture), and education (measured 
primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment).  
My replication of the second stage uses the predicted GINI values obtained in the first 
stage to calculate on the one hand, the levels of primary FDI, and on the other the levels of 
secondary and tertiary FDI, aggregated. The control variables for the second stage attempt to 
resemble that of the Alesina and Perotti model: percentage of urban population and political 
instability (using two indicators from the International Country Risk Guide: internal conflict, and 
law and order). The 2SLS model looks as following: 
Stage A: 1.a) INEQUALITY= B0 + B1 (LABOR-intensive) + B2 (CAPITAL-intensive) + 
B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 (Forest land/Agricultural 
worker) + B5 (Primary school enrollment) + B6 (Secondary school 
enrollment) + B7 (Tertiary school enrollment)  
 
Natural 
Resources and 
Primary FDI 
Stage B: 1.b) PRIMARY FDI= B0 + B1 (INEQUALITY from Stage A) + B2 (% Urban 
population) + B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 (Forest 
land/Agricultural worker) + B5 (Internal conflict) + B6 (Law and order) 
 
Stage A: 
 
2.a) INEQUALITY= B0 + B1 (LABOR-intensive) + B2 (CAPITAL-intensive) + 
B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 (Forest land/Agricultural 
worker) + B5 (Primary school enrollment) + B6 (Secondary school 
enrollment) + B7 (Tertiary school enrollment)  
Natural 
Resources and 
Secondary and 
Tertiary FDI 
 
Stage B: 
 
2.b) SECONDARY and TERTIARY FDI= B0 + B1 (INEQUALITY from Stage A) 
+ B2 (% Urban population) + B3 (Cropland/Agricultural worker) + B4 
(Forest land/Agricultural worker) + B5 (Internal conflict) + B6 (Law and 
order) 
 
Dependent Variables 
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The dependent variable of income inequality is measured by the GINI coefficients of the 
fifteen Latin American countries taken from the World Development Indicators database. The 
dependent variables of primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI are from the United Nations 
database. The models by Leamer et al. and Alesina and Perotti that inspired this research utilize 
the same variables with the only difference that the latter do not specify whether investment is 
domestic or foreign. By differentiating FDI by primary, secondary, and tertiary we are able to 
better understand the implications of different types of export product mixes, and their impact on 
inequality. Primary FDI refers to investment in petroleum, mining, and agriculture. Secondary 
FDI refers to investment in manufacture industries. Tertiary FDI refers to investments in service 
industries. All types of FDI are measured as a percentage share of GDP (in constant U$ 2000).   
Independent variables 
Natural endowment indicators  
In order to replicate as much as possible the Leamer et al. model I recreated their 
measures of exports, by replacing them with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). I revised the indicators provided by the WDI and 
noticed that the category of Food and Agricultural Raw materials exports was not applicable for 
testing the model that Laemer presents. In such categories, crops of all types are aggregated 
under a single variable: Food. I dismissed them since none of them allow us to differentiate 
between capital-intensive and labor-intensive exports in the region. Considering that cereals are 
more capital-intensive than other crops, like fruits and vegetables that employ more labor, I 
decided to break up the category of Food and measure raw material exports individually from 
FAO data on each of these commodities.  
13
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In order to resemble the Leamer et al. model I also recreated their measures of petroleum 
products, by replacing it with Fuel exports from the WDI. The Leamer et al.’s variable MAT 
(fertilizers, coal, natural gas, and metals) has been replaced by the WDI indicator Ore exports 
excluding natural gas due to data availability. The variable TRP-PERM (tropical permanent: 
fruit, sugar, and coffee) was replaced by FAO data on each of these commodities, adding 
vegetables to the list of this category, because FAO aggregates vegetables and fruits together. 
The variable TRP-ANNUAL (tropical annual: vegetables and grains) is composed by FAO values 
on exports of the three major types of grain in the region: maize, rice, and soybeans. The variable 
ANL (Animal products: live animals, meat dairy, eggs, fish, hides, and fats) has been gathered 
from FAO on all those commodities except live animals, because Latin America exports mostly 
meat rather than animals. The variable CER (Cereals and grains: cereals, feeding stuff, tobacco, 
oil seeds, and fibers) have all been individually collected using FAO data, as well as for the 
variables FOR-PERM (forest permanent: wood, lumber) and for FOR-MANUF (Forest 
manufactures: pulp and paper). The variable LAB (labor-intensive manufactures: furniture, 
clothing, footwear, coins) has been replaced by the indicator Manufactures exports from WDI. 
The variable CAP (capital-intensive manufactures: leather, rubber, textiles, iron, steel, fixtures) is 
probably the weakest of all the variables, since only rubber and textiles were available from FAO 
data. The variables MCH (machinery) and CHM (Chemicals) are part of the Manufactures 
exports indicator from the WDI. These variables from above have been grouped into two major 
variables: CAPITAL-intensive exports, and LABOR-intensive exports. CAPITAL aggregates 
FOR-MANUF, Ores exports, Manufacture exports, CAP, and Fuels. LABOR aggregates: TRP-
PERM, TRP-ANNUAL, ANL, and FOR-MANUF.  
Political instability indicators 
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The political instability index proposed by Alesina and Perotti poses a conceptual 
obstacle. Their index consists of five variables: ASSASS and DEATH, which capture phenomena 
of mass violence and illegal forms of political expression; SCOUP and UCOUP, which capture 
illegal and typically violent transfers of executive power, successful or unsuccessful; and DEM a 
dummy variable to control for the higher likelihood of violence in dictatorship. However, 
political instability is reflected not only in the outcomes (attempts of coup d’état, assassinations) 
but rather in the process of deterioration of government: government unity, legislative strength, 
popular support, unemployment, consumer confidence, contract viability/expropriation. Violence 
and attempts of coups do not capture the process of deterioration, which might become the red 
flags perceived by foreign companies, who by the time there has been a coup d’état they may 
have already withdrew their investments from the host country. The decision making process of 
a company deciding on whether to invest or not in a country involves analyzing a more general 
picture of political stability. Even though investors consider violence an important factor in the 
decision to invest, they would most likely not consider exact numbers of assassinations, but 
rather will try to get information on the general perception about the political environment of the 
host country.  
Other options for measures of political instability are indicators from International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the State Failure Index from 
Foreign Policy, and Nations in Transit, from Freedom House. The data sources of this index are 
extracted from expert assessments rating multiple countries. This index resembles that of Nations 
in Transit (Freedom House), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Global Insight, World Bank 
CPIA. All these expert assessments have been widely used for comparisons across countries and 
over time. Their methods differ in several potentially important ways. The ratings for the ICRG 
15
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are formed by a network of correspondents with country-specific expertise, but are determined 
centrally by a very small number of people. Some scholars have disregarded the ICRG index for 
the lack of disclosure in their assessment criteria and its methodology (including sources of 
information) and for not facilitating extensive country narratives containing qualitative 
assessments to accompany the quantitative ratings (Knack, 2007). However, this index was 
adopted for this model because it not only focuses on political violence but also on the factors 
determining government stability that private investors care the most. Sources producing these 
types of indicators have different constituencies or audiences, with potential implications for 
what their ratings are measuring. The ICRG is marketed by profit-making companies and multi-
national investors and other paying subscribers (Knack, 2007). Most subscribers to the ICRG are 
more interested in conditions facing foreign investors than in those facing local investors. The 
ICRG ratings can be expected to focus on those most pertinent obstacles facing foreign investors, 
who are their paying subscribers. For each of the five indicators of political instability the ICRG 
provides a single measure intended to reflect a mix of various other aspects. As a result, the 
indicators of political instability I decide to use for this research are taken from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
The first of these indicators, called internal conflict, is an assessment of political violence 
in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to 
those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The 
lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war. The risk rating assigned is 
the sum of three subcomponents (civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, and civil 
disorder), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score 
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of 4 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk. Finally, the 
indicators law and order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to 
three points. The law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system, while the order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1 
– if it suffers from a very high crime rate of if the law is routinely ignored without effective 
sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes). 
Results: 
The first stage of the multivariate regression does not entirely resonate with previous 
literature on the relationship between natural endowments and inequality. The model of natural 
resources is able to explain almost 40 percent of the variance in the levels of GINI coefficients. 
My results in Table 1 show a strong positive correlation between inequality and levels of labor-
intensive exports with significance of 1%. This strong relationship is the opposite that I expected. 
Countries that possess large shares of labor-intensive industries are associated with high levels of 
GINI coefficients, because the returns to labor might not increase with the rise of the relative 
prices of these industries. Setbacks to my hypothesis might become a plausible argument since 
an increase in return to factor rewards might be occurring as a result of regulatory labor policies 
or redistributive politics by the host country, such as government spending in social programs, 
subsidies etc. A strong positive relationship with a 1% statistical significance exists between 
levels of GINI and secondary school enrollment. This is also the opposite of what I expected.  
Surprisingly, results show that capital-intensive exports have a negative relationship with 
GINI coefficients with 10% of statistical significance. This group of industries tends to have a 
higher concentration of capital in the hands of a small percentage of the population. Leamer et al. 
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show how these industries employ smaller numbers of workers, and I deduce that the negative 
relationship could be the result of the grouping of different variables with different product mix 
into a single variable. However, when the industries that compose the capital-intensive group are 
disaggregated by specific industry the relationship appears to be stronger among exports from 
industries such as mining and cereal. In comparison to the rest of the product mix of Latin 
American countries, the share of labor factors in these industries is significantly smaller than 
capital factors, relative to other commodities. Furthermore, tertiary education shows a sound 
negative relationship with GINI coefficients, which might not necessary be a causal connection, 
but the symptom of an already unequal society with a larger presence of skilled workers. If more 
people enroll in tertiary education, more people in the middle class have access to opportunities 
for higher wages. This result could be interpreted in two ways: or also that poor people accessing 
to tertiary education through publicly subsidized education, a factor not included in this model; 
or also that more middle income people are attaining education and distancing themselves from 
poor people in the job market. 
 
Table 1 
STAGE 1 Variables Grouped: GINI and correlations with Natural Resource Exports 
grouped into labor- and capital-intensive; Education, and Land Per Worker  
Variables Estimate coefficient Standard error 
Labor-intensive exports/GDP 27.152*** (7.965) 
Capital-intensive exports /GDP -12.726* (6.912) 
School enrollment, primary (% gross) 0.013 (0.061) 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 0.237*** (0.048) 
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School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) -0.317*** (0.060) 
Cropland/Agricultural worker -11.996 (12.084) 
Forestland/Agricultural worker -5.994* (3.576) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
When I ungroup the variables composing the labor- and capital-intensive categories in 
Table 2, the results of some variables weakly confirm the hypothesis. First, the capital exports 
variable from the Leamer model –note that this is not the Capital-intensive variable grouping 
other capital-intensive industries- shows a sound positive relation with GINI coefficients. The 
results resonate with my hypothesis and with theories based on the Stopel-Samuelson model. As 
predicted, the results of tropical crops, fuels, and animal products show that their levels have a 
positive relation with GINI levels, having a negative impact on equality.  
However, mining and cereals are negatively related to the levels of GINI. Both industries 
share the same characteristics of low levels of people employed, and a dependence on natural 
resources. Surprisingly, abundance of these endowments is correlated with high levels of 
equality, the opposite of what I expected and what Spilimbergo et al. (1999) had concluded. 
Government distortionary taxation might be interfering with the logical and expected impact of 
these industries on inequality. Cropland and forestland per agricultural worker shows a negative 
relation with GINI coefficients, which could be interpreted as capital-intensive agricultural 
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industries, contradicting my hypothesis. Tertiary school enrollment also shows a strong negative 
relationship with the levels of inequality. The results do not echo my hypothesis and a reason for 
this might be due to other factors not included in the model, such as type of tertiary enrollment, 
especially those involved in public education. Ungrouping the categories of labor- and capital-
intensive does not allow us to conclude that countries with predominant capital-intensive exports 
in their product mix show higher levels of income inequality neither can we conclude the 
opposite about labor-intensive ones.       
Table 2 
STAGE 1 Variables Ungrouped: GINI and correlations with Natural Resource Exports 
ungrouped from labor- and capital- intensive type; Education, and Land Per Worker.1  
Variables Estimate Standard Error 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 0.283*** (0.053) 
Ores exports/GDP -48.114*** (12.545) 
CAP exports/GDP 264.959*** (82.140) 
Cropland/Agricultural Worker -37.991** (14.602) 
Fuel exports/GDP 23.302** (9.582) 
TRP-ANNUAL exports/GDP 287.696** (120.786) 
CER exports/GDP -200.603** (94.494) 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) -0.153** (0.074) 
Forestland/Agricultural Worker -8.495** (4.228) 
ANL exports/GDP 180.753* (97.361) 
TOTAL exports 0.000 (0.000) 
FOR-MANUF exports/GDP 166.109 (196.084) 
TRP-PERM exports/GDP 18.122 (23.008) 
Manufacture exports/GDP -6.413 (11.181) 
20
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 7 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 21
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/21
21 
 
FOR-PERM exports/GDP -361.776 (1122.136) 
School enrollment, primary (% gross) 0.019 0.065 
Observations 
R2 
360 
.4 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 (exports as share of GDP in constant U$2000; education as primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment; Land per worker, as Crops 
and Forest land per Agricultural worker) 
The predicted values of inequality generated by the regression line were used for the 
second stage of the research estimating primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI as a result of 
inequality (values from stage 1), percentage of urban population, and indicators of political 
instability are shown in Table 3. The results show that the relation between GINI coefficients 
and levels of primary FDI has no statistical significance. Notice that there is a strong positive 
relationship with secondary and tertiary FDI with less than 1% statistical significance. This, 
partially resonates with the results presented by Walsh and Yu (2010), who claim that primary 
investments that have little contact with the broader economy would not be expected to be 
affected by the development of the financial system or the degree of school enrollment in the 
population (Walsh and Yu, 2010, 13). However, the results do not echo the hypothesis in that 
levels of secondary and tertiary FDI increase in societies with labor-intensive industries that have 
more unequal societies. A possible explanation for this might be that secondary and tertiary FDI 
are not able to find the human capital and skilled labor required for manufacture- and service-
oriented investments, as well as other factors outside of the scope of this paper.  
As Alesina and Perotti (1996) demonstrated, my results show that political stability is 
generally associated with higher levels of primary, secondary, and tertiary FDI. Investors might 
follow other investors that have previously settled in a host country. In this way, knowledge 
about what countries are good for investment is signaled in the market place, and sometimes 
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shared from investor to investor because both might benefit greatly by the presence of the other 
due to potential partnership and cooperation. Even though increasing the inflow of FDI also 
raises competition in the host country, the business community might make the environment 
exponentially better for foreign businesses and may allow for the replication of good business 
practices and experience from those who have been in the host country for longer. Another 
conclusion is that inequality and political instability explain only 13 percent of the variance of 
primary FDI whereas inequality coupled with the same control variables explains 40 percent of 
the variance of secondary and tertiary FDI.     
Table 3 
STAGE 2: FDI, Inequality as a path coefficient, and Political Instability. 
 
Variables Total FDI Primary FDI Secondary and Tertiary FDI 
GINI  0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 0.000 
Urban population (% of total) 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 0.001 
Internal Conflict -0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 0.000 
Law and Order 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 0.001 
Observations 
 
R2 
360 
 
360 
 
0.13 
360 
 
0.4 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Conclusion 
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Even though this research does not find strong evidence to prove that inequality is the 
appropriate coefficient path to explain levels of FDI from natural resource abundance, it does 
explain more the variance in secondary and tertiary FDI than it does in primary FDI. The 
inequality levels generated by the levels of capital and labor-intensive exports of the first stage of 
the model have a positive relationship with the levels of secondary and tertiary FDI, and no 
relation with the levels of primary FDI. Whereas the model predicting levels of primary FDI 
from levels of inequality explain 13 percent of the variance, the model predicting levels of 
secondary and tertiary FDI explain 40 percent. Even though, the results do not fit the hypotheses, 
they somewhat resonate with that of Leamer et al. Crops that require more labor such as the 
production of fruits and vegetables, have a positive effect on equality in the region. Finally, my 
results do not confirm the findings of Leamer and Alesina and Perotti, but further research is 
needed for the evaluation of inequality as the path coefficient explaining FDI from natural 
resource abundance. 
Further research 
The weakness of the model is the result of many factors that could be addressed in further 
research. First, omitted variable bias, caused by the exclusion of typical macroeconomic control 
variables for FDI such as openness, GDP growth, average inflation, real effective exchange rate, 
etc. could impact the results significantly. Even though data on these macroeconomic variables 
was collected it was not included in this model in order to replicate the work of Leamer and 
Alesina and Perotti, who only used the control variables specified in the 2SLS model.3 Also, data 
                                                 
3 Alesina and Perotti, who studied 71 countries also included other control variables for middle 
class, ratio of real domestic investment, percentage of the population belong to the main 
ethnic linguistic group, among those referred in this paper. 
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on FDI broken into primary, secondary, and tertiary was very incomplete and only the fifteen 
countries chosen had relative complete values. Also, adding more control variables would result 
in losing too many degrees of freedom for my small dataset. Second, issues of endogeneity might 
be impacting the high correlation between inequality and labor-intensive exports. It is uncertain 
from my model whether labor-intensive exports proliferate in more equal societies as society 
demands government to attract jobs, or whether equality is the result of labor-intensive industries 
that enjoy higher returns to factor rewards. The same applies for the negative relation between 
capital-intensive exports and inequality. Third, this paper does not include a correction of the 
variance-covariance usually performed in 2SLS models, by applying the correct mean squared 
error. Further research should address the temporal dependence of my data and the fact that 
errors cluster by country. Finally, natural resources such as land might have different effects on 
inequality, as crops that require more machinery and less labor experience high returns to capital 
might experience different export taxes. Unless the government engages in distortionary taxing 
from exports of those industries, then levels of equality might remain low. If this is the case, then 
future models should consider government spending in social programs and poverty alleviation 
as a percentage of GDP to capture the effect of government in redressing inequality.   
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STAGE 1 
 
Response GINI ESTIMATED FROM FIT LINE 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
 
Summary of Fit 
   
RSquare 0.389816 
RSquare Adj 0.359523 
Root Mean Square Error 5.279111 
Mean of Response 53.46007 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 149 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 7 2510.3810 358.626 12.8683 
Error 141 3929.5311 27.869 Prob > F 
C. Total 148 6439.9122  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  45.153234 5.712713 7.90 <.0001* 
Labor intensive/GDP  27.151769 7.964554 3.41 0.0009* 
Capital intensive/GDP  -12.72634 6.911893 -1.84 0.0677 
School enrollment, primary (% gross)  0.0133385 0.061063 0.22 0.8274 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  0.2371181 0.048346 4.90 <.0001* 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)  -0.316805 0.060309 -5.25 <.0001* 
Cropland/AgriculWorker  -11.99572 12.0835 -0.99 0.3225 
Forestland/AgricWorker  -5.993621 3.576167 -1.68 0.0960 
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Residual by Predicted Plot 
 
Labor intensive/GDP 
Leverage Plot 
 
Capital intensive/GDP 
Leverage Plot 
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School enrollment, primary (% gross) 
Leverage Plot 
 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 
Leverage Plot 
 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
Leverage Plot 
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Cropland/AgriculWorker 
Leverage Plot 
 
Forestland/AgricWorker 
Leverage Plot 
 
Response GINI ESTIMATED FROM FIT LINE 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
 
Summary of Fit 
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RSquare 0.532284 
RSquare Adj 0.475592 
Root Mean Square Error 4.776876 
Mean of Response 53.46007 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 149 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 16 3427.8649 214.242 9.3889 
Error 132 3012.0472 22.819 Prob > F 
C. Total 148 6439.9122  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  38.85227 6.022671 6.45 <.0001* 
TOTAL EXPORT  -1.2e-11 1.34e-11 -0.90 0.3689 
TRP-PERMExp/GDP  18.122137 23.00849 0.79 0.4323 
TRP-ANNUALExp/GDP  287.69563 120.7857 2.38 0.0187* 
ANLExp/GDP  180.75337 97.36118 1.86 0.0656 
CERExp/GDP  -200.6028 94.49447 -2.12 0.0356* 
CAPExp/GDP  264.95914 82.13953 3.23 0.0016* 
FOR-MANUFExp/GDP  166.10939 196.0835 0.85 0.3985 
FOR-PERMExp/GDP  -361.7763 1122.136 -0.32 0.7477 
FuelTotalExp/GDP  23.301694 9.582488 2.43 0.0164* 
OresTotalExp/GDP  -48.11397 12.54458 -3.84 0.0002* 
ManufTotExp/GDP  -6.412795 11.18058 -0.57 0.5672 
School enrollment, primary (% gross)  0.0194541 0.064645 0.30 0.7639 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  0.2833097 0.053413 5.30 <.0001* 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)  -0.153082 0.073664 -2.08 0.0396* 
Cropland/AgriculWorker  -37.99078 14.60209 -2.60 0.0103* 
Forestland/AgricWorker  -8.494896 4.227537 -2.01 0.0465* 
 
 
Sorted Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t 
Ratio 
Prob>|t| 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  0.2833097 0.053413 5.30 <.0001* 
OresTotalExp/GDP  -48.11397 12.54458 -3.84 0.0002* 
CAPExp/GDP  264.95914 82.13953 3.23 0.0016* 
Cropland/AgriculWorker  -37.99078 14.60209 -2.60 0.0103* 
FuelTotalExp/GDP  23.301694 9.582488 2.43 0.0164* 
TRP-ANNUALExp/GDP  287.69563 120.7857 2.38 0.0187* 
CERExp/GDP  -200.6028 94.49447 -2.12 0.0356* 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)  -0.153082 0.073664 -2.08 0.0396* 
Forestland/AgricWorker  -8.494896 4.227537 -2.01 0.0465* 
ANLExp/GDP  180.75337 97.36118 1.86 0.0656 
TOTAL EXPORT  -1.2e-11 1.34e-11 -0.90 0.3689 
FOR-MANUFExp/GDP  166.10939 196.0835 0.85 0.3985 
TRP-PERMExp/GDP  18.122137 23.00849 0.79 0.4323 
ManufTotExp/GDP  -6.412795 11.18058 -0.57 0.5672 
FOR-PERMExp/GDP  -361.7763 1122.136 -0.32 0.7477 
School enrollment, primary (% gross)  0.0194541 0.064645 0.30 0.7639 
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Prediction Profiler 
 
 
STAGE 2 
Response PRIMARY/GDP 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
 
Summary of Fit 
   
RSquare 0.134758 
RSquare Adj 0.117551 
Root Mean Square Error 0.010698 
Mean of Response 0.005917 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 360 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 7 0.00627394 0.000896 7.8318 
Error 352 0.04028334 0.000114 Prob > F 
C. Total 359 0.04655728  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  -0.00438 0.004732 -0.93 0.3552 
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables  1.0368e-5 7.523e-5 0.14 0.8905 
Urban population (% of total)  -8.277e-6 4.245e-5 -0.19 0.8455 
InternalConflict  -0.001082 0.000317 -3.41 0.0007* 
LawOrder  0.0029343 0.00069 4.25 <.0001* 
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Residual by Predicted Plot 
 
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables 
Leverage Plot 
 
Urban population (% of total) 
Leverage Plot 
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InternalConflict 
Leverage Plot 
 
LawOrder 
Leverage Plot 
 
Response SEC TER/GDP 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
 
Summary of Fit 
   
RSquare 0.409001 
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RSquare Adj 0.397248 
Root Mean Square Error 0.014866 
Mean of Response 0.015764 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 360 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 7 0.05383886 0.007691 34.8002 
Error 352 0.07779618 0.000221 Prob > F 
C. Total 359 0.13163504  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  -0.029089 0.006575 -4.42 <.0001* 
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables  0.0003515 0.000105 3.36 0.0009* 
Urban population (% of total)  -0.000101 0.000059 -1.71 0.0889 
InternalConflict  0.0003228 0.00044 0.73 0.4641 
LawOrder  0.0017398 0.000959 1.82 0.0704 
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F   
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables 1 1 0.00249857 11.3051 0.0009*  
Urban population (% of total) 1 1 0.00064331 2.9108 0.0889  
InternalConflict 1 1 0.00011874 0.5372 0.4641  
LawOrder 1 1 0.00072808 3.2943 0.0704  
 
Residual by Predicted Plot 
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GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables 
Leverage Plot 
 
Urban population (% of total) 
Leverage Plot 
 
InternalConflict 
Leverage Plot 
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LawOrder 
Leverage Plot 
 
 
Response TOTAL FDI/GDP 
Whole Model 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
 
Summary of Fit 
   
RSquare 0.39439 
RSquare Adj 0.382346 
Root Mean Square Error 0.019459 
Mean of Response 0.021681 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 360 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 7 0.08680081 0.012400 32.7474 
Error 352 0.13328820 0.000379 Prob > F 
C. Total 359 0.22008901  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  -0.033469 0.008607 -3.89 0.0001* 
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables  0.0003619 0.000137 2.64 0.0085* 
Urban population (% of total)  -0.000109 7.722e-5 -1.41 0.1592 
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Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
InternalConflict  -0.000759 0.000577 -1.32 0.1889 
LawOrder  0.0046741 0.001255 3.73 0.0002* 
 
 
Residual by Predicted Plot 
 
GINI ESTIMATED from aggregated variables 
Leverage Plot 
 
Urban population (% of total) 
Leverage Plot 
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InternalConflict 
Leverage Plot 
 
LawOrder 
Leverage Plot 
 
 
Response GINI ESTIMATED FROM FIT LINE 
Actual by Predicted Plot 
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Summary of Fit 
   
RSquare 0.389816 
RSquare Adj 0.359523 
Root Mean Square Error 5.279111 
Mean of Response 53.46007 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 149 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 7 2510.3810 358.626 12.8683 
Error 141 3929.5311 27.869 Prob > F 
C. Total 148 6439.9122  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  45.153234 5.712713 7.90 <.0001* 
Labor intensive/GDP  27.151769 7.964554 3.41 0.0009* 
Capital intensive/GDP  -12.72634 6.911893 -1.84 0.0677 
School enrollment, primary (% gross)  0.0133385 0.061063 0.22 0.8274 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  0.2371181 0.048346 4.90 <.0001* 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)  -0.316805 0.060309 -5.25 <.0001* 
Cropland/AgriculWorker  -11.99572 12.0835 -0.99 0.3225 
Forestland/AgricWorker  -5.993621 3.576167 -1.68 0.0960 
 
 
Sorted Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio t Ratio Prob>|t| 
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) -0.316805 0.060309 -5.25 
 
<.0001* 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)  0.237118
1 
0.048346 4.90 
 
<.0001* 
Labor intensive/GDP  27.15176
9 
7.964554 3.41 
 
0.0009* 
Capital intensive/GDP  -12.72634 6.911893 -1.84 
 
0.0677 
Forestland/AgricWorker  -5.993621 3.576167 -1.68 
 
0.0960 
Cropland/AgriculWorker  -11.99572 12.0835 -0.99 
 
0.3225 
School enrollment, primary (% gross) 
 0.013338
5 
0.061063 0.22 
 
0.8274 
 
 
Prediction Profiler 
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